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In the past five years, research sponsored by the World Bank on the economic aspects of civil 
war1 under the research directorship of Oxford economist Paul Collier has had an 
extraordinary influence on the subsequent study of violent conflict and civil war and on 
international policy. The research project has now turned its attention to the problem of 
countries emerging from civil war and what Collier and his co-author, Anke Hoeffler, call “a 
first systematic empirical analysis of aid and policy reform in the post-conflict growth 
process.”2 Building on the influence of their earlier research and the lively interest currently in 
knowledge about and policy on post-conflict strategies, this work is likely to be equally 
influential on research, thinking, and policy. It is all the more important, therefore, to subject 
the research to critical examination before it becomes established as conventional wisdom.  
This note reports one such attempt to analyze some major methodological problems with the 
study and argues that the research cannot sustain the conclusions they draw or the resulting 
policy recommendations. 
1. Introduction3 
The original research program equated civil war with rebellion and focused on individual-
level motivations to rebel, arguing through econometric analyses of the various factors 
correlated with civil-war onset that rationally calculated economic benefits were far better 
predictors than were grievances associated with the “ancient ethnic hatreds” and “clash of 
(religious) civilizations” schools. The next phase treated civil war as a collective action 
problem and identified the financial resources (specifically primary commodity export 
earnings) that enabled leaders to organize and sustain a rebellion. This step made it possible to 
propose an explanation for the duration of civil wars and policy recommendations for war 
termination that have since been institutionalized in programs such as UN-mandated targeted 
sanctions and the Kimberley process on conflict diamonds. By this shift from a logic of 
individual motivations to one driven by opportunities for rebellion, Collier and his associates 
also entered more deeply into the policy world of conflict prevention by suggesting structural 
economic factors – economic decline, dependence on primary commodity exports, low and 
declining per capita income, a large pool of unemployed young men -- that make countries 
more or less at risk of a civil war.4 
 
Applying the same logic used for civil-war onset, what they call conflict “proneness,” to post-
conflict circumstances, Collier and  his team argue, in a subsequent summary volume on the 
relation between development and conflict, that countries emerging from civil war are even 
more vulnerable to this “conflict trap.”5 Economic decline leads to civil war which “wrecks 
the economy and increases the risk of further war” (p.1).  Economic growth is necessary to 
                                                 
1 The project was titled the Economics of Political and Criminal Violence. 
2 First reported in a World Bank Policy Research Working Paper circulated in October 2002, their article, “Aid, 
Policy, and Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” will be published this year in the European Economic Review 
(hereafter C&H 2004). 
3 This research note is base don a longer paper presented at the UNU/Wider conference, ”Making Peace Work”, 
Helsinki, 4-5 June 2004. Anette Walstad Enes at the Chr. Michelsen Institute assisted in the preparation of this 
paper. 
4 The critical literature this project has generated is massive. Useful examples include Sambanis (2004); 
Ballentine and Sherman (2003); Addison and Murshed (2003); Marchal (2004); Gutierrez Sanin (2004); and 
Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
5 Breaking the Conflict Trap (Collier, et al.: 2003) summarizes their findings on civil war onset, duration, 
termination, and post-war aid together with the results of other quantitative research on civil war, including the 
long-term economic and health costs, the spillover effects to neighbourhoods and the world, and the role of 
international peacekeeping. Its aim, however, is to promote the “moral right and practical duty” (p. 8) of 
international intervention to reduce the global incidence of civil war. 
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escape that trap. Turning to the literature on the effectiveness of external economic aid in 
stimulating growth, particularly the Dollar-Burnside studies at the World Bank,6 Collier and 
Hoeffler then seek to identify the optimal timing of economic aid in post-conflict countries 
and sequencing of economic policy prescriptions to generate that growth. 
 
Breaking the Conflict Trap, like the earlier research on civil-war onset, thus emphasizes the 
economic aspects of war termination and peacebuilding. Its recommended policy package  has 
four elements: external economic assistance based on the 2002 research on the relation 
between aid, policy, and growth in post-conflict countries; methods for governing financial 
resources (particularly revenues from natural resources and from diaspora, based on their 
research on civil-war onset) to prevent them from falling into the hands of potential new or 
revived rebel groups; international military intervention, not to create a credible commitment 
to peace (Walter 2001; Fortna 2003) but to keep military expenditures low because high 
military expenditures in the first period of peace are associated with a higher risk of conflict; 
and delays in the introduction of democratic political institutions until some economic growth 
has laid a stronger foundation for political stability. 
 
Despite the newness of their focus on post-conflict questions, the Collier and Hoeffler 
conclusions already inform the aid policy of some major donors. Although running counter to 
the current practice of most donors, their recommendations and the “hard data” on which they 
are said to be based have wide appeal. In a policy realm increasingly characterized by 
pessimism and frustrating complexity, informed by interventions from Bosnia and Kosovo to 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the conclusions are simple and concrete, and apparently apolitical, 
credible, and universally applicable. 
 
The Collier and Hoeffler study (henceforth, C&H 2004) raises two types of issues. 
Theoretically, as is already the case with their research on the causes of civil war, many will 
question whether the causal relations between aid and growth and between economic growth 
and peace have been sufficiently specified, whether large-N quantitative analysis is applicable 
to an issue with such great internal variation (types of civil wars and types of civil war 
endings) and, to practitioners, so sensitive to context, and whether an argument about the 
economic causes of civil war is in any way applicable to the causes of peace. Because even a 
casual reading of the study reveals questionable coding decisions, however, we decided to 
examine its methodological soundness first, before confronting these theoretical issues. This 
note reports our efforts to recode their sample, aiming to correct questionable decisions, make 
allowance for other factors relevant to post-war aid and recovery such as the relative impact 
of the war on the national economy and the level of destruction and displacement, and create 
greater internal consistency in the units of analysis, and on that basis, to retest their study and 
its conclusions. 
  
One issue we could not resolve  in attempting to replicate their approach, unfortunately, was 
the effect of one of the key variables for their policy conclusions, namely the role of 
government policies and institutions that economists now widely consider critical to the aid-
growth relationship. On this variable, their data belong to a confidential World Bank data set 
(the CPIA), which is not available to outside scholars. In terms of scientific rules and the 
principle of transparency, this is naturally of great concern, as has been emphasized in the 
                                                 
6 The particular formulation and data set of their study, as will be discussed below, is from the Collier-Dollar 
(2002) continuation of the Dollar-Burnside studies. 
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scholarly community.7 For the purpose of this study, Anke Hoeffler kindly agreed to run some 
basic regressions for us using the CPIA on our recoded sample,8 but this permitted only a 
partial retesting. 
2. The Findings of Collier and Hoeffler (2002; 2004) 
The C&H 2004 study examines the relationship between aid, economic growth, and economic 
policy variables in countries that have emerged from civil war. The main purpose is to 
identify the optimal magnitude and timing of aid in relation to economic growth. A related 
concern is to assess the role of host country policy on growth in the post-conflict period. 
Policy is divided into macro, structural, and anti-poverty components, and rated according to 
the composite CPIA index. The findings lead to three specific policy recommendations. 
 
First, aid is “considerably more effective” in generating growth in post-conflict countries than 
in countries that have not recently experienced civil wars (let us call them “normal 
countries”). Since their working assumption is that growth reduces poverty (which they base 
on the Collier and Dollar 2002 study), they conclude that “[f]or ‘poverty efficiency,’ aid 
volumes [in post-conflict situations] should be approximately double those in other situations” 
(p.14).9 Second, the timing of aid is critical to achieve aid-growth efficiency. To this end, 
donors should phase in aid gradually during the first four years after the conflict, and then 
“gradually taper back to normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade” (p.14). In 
reality donors tend to do the opposite by providing large amounts of aid soon after the conflict 
when the situation commands world attention, and then reducing aid. Historically, aid “has 
tapered out just when it should have been tapering in” (p.14). Third, regarding policy 
priorities, C&H find that improvement in anti-poverty measures (“social policies”) in post-
conflict situations has a positive impact on growth and therefore should be given priority in 
the reform process. 
 
These findings thus affirm that “aid matters” and particularly in post-conflict situations. The 
first and third conclusions reinforce the comforting notion that there is no major trade-off 
between poverty and growth and that this is even more so in post-conflict societies than in 
“normal” situations. The second conclusion regarding the actual timing of aid seems 
intuitively correct: we have all seen the massive media attention and donor focus on a society 
that is just emerging from war and the pledging conferences tied to a peace settlement (or 
their equivalent). The recommendation that aid should be phased in slowly seems more 
controversial. It conflicts, for instance, with the widely accepted notion that an immediate 
“peace dividend,” rapid reconstruction, specific schemes such as financing reforms required 
in the peace agreement, and early, large-scale employment of demobilized soldiers are 
important to solidify the peace. 
                                                 
7 See symposium in International Studies Perspectives, no. 1, 2003, based on a session and the 2002 annual 
conference of the ISA, where editors of four prominent academic journals in international relations made a 
common commitment to publish only articles based on open data that could be replicated. We wish to thank Nils 
Petter Gleditsch for bringing this  to our attention.  
8 We wish to thank Nils Petter Gleditsch for facilitating the arrangement. 
9 Unless otherwise noted, all page references are to C&H 2004. 
 4 
3. Methodological issues in C&H 
All of these conclusions are questionable on methodological grounds. We address sample size 
and the methodological issues in the aid-policy-growth regressions before turning to coding 
issues. 
3.1 Sample size  
C&H list 31 cases of countries emerging from civil wars in their sample, although the number 
for which they have observations is slightly smaller - only 27. The effects of aid are observed 
in three periods after the war ends of four-year time periods each: “peace onset,” “post-
conflict 1,” and “post-conflict 2.” Of the 27 countries, C&H have data regarding the effects of 
aid in post-conflict situations for only 13 cases in the first period after war, 13 cases in the 
following period, and only eight for the final period.10 Moreover, the data set is not complete 
for every relevant post-conflict period, e.g., it is not the same set of post-conflict societies in 
the first period and in the second period after peace. In the end, the conclusions regarding the 
effects of aid in post-conflict situations – that is, the principal findings listed in the first two 
conclusions above – depend on between 8 and 13 observations. The small sample size in itself 
raises critical questions regarding the representativeness and validity of the conclusions. 
 
C&H give the usual caveats about the need for caution when generalizing from such a small 
sample. Nevertheless, they proceed to draw quite specific conclusions and make related 
policy recommendations. For instance, they recommend that “the pattern of aid disbursements 
should probably gradually rise during the first four years, and gradually taper back to normal 
levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade” (p.14 ) – that is, in the second full peace 
period for which they have only eight observations. This conclusion is incorporated in 
Breaking the Conflict Trap -- “the high- impact phase is during the middle four or five years of 
the [post-conflict] decade (p. 158) -- and is referenced to the C&H study.  The conclusion that 
aid should be reduced in the second peace period because the growth benefits of aid taper off, 
and the location of its peak in the middle of the post-war decade, presumes that the shape of 
the curve into the second full peace period is known. Yet eight observations constitute an 
extremely thin basis of knowledge. Indeed, they acknowledge as much elsewhere in the paper, 
in a slightly different context. Referring to the Collier-Dollar (2002) study which they use for 
growth data, they note, “There are only eight countries in the Collier-Dollar sample that have 
completed this peace period and such a sample is evidently too small for the approach” (p. 9). 
As a result, it is “unfortunately not feasible to investigate the effects during the second full 
peace episode” (p.9).  
3.2 Methodological weaknesses in aid-policy-growth regressions 
The policy recommendations in C&H 2004 stem from applying methods used in much of the 
econometric work that tries to apply interaction effects to show how policy and aid affect 
growth. These methods have some generally recognized weaknesses, and there are some 
standard ways of testing for their impact. As we could not perform these tests without access 
to the CPIA, a second-best option was to review the main methodological concerns expressed 
in connection with the kind of interaction terms that C&H use and consider to what extent 
they also apply here.  
  
                                                 
10 C&H do not use annual data, but only an average for the 4-year period. The peace-onset period is  “discounted” 
by the month/year in which the war ended.  
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C&H use an almost identical interaction term to that in the Burnside and Dollar studies (1997, 
2000). The Burnside and Dollar studies, which show that aid increases growth only if the 
macroeconomic policies are good, have generated heated debate.11 Criticism on 
methodological grounds, as well as the policy implications of channelling aid only to 
countries that adopt “good” policies, has been made by Hansen and Tarp (2000, 2001), 
McPherson (2000), Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), Dayton-Johnson and Hoddinott (2001, 
2003), Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001), Lensink and White (2001), Lu and Ram (2001), 
Akhand and Gupta (2002), and Easterly, Levine and Roodman (2003). By contrast, the study 
by Collier and Dollar (2002) supports Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000).  
 
The main criticism against Burnside and Dollar (2000) is that the interaction term between aid 
and a measure of institutions and policies is very fragile and vulnerable to minor changes in 
the methodology. Such changes could be alterations in the specification of the econometric 
model, application of a different estimation method, or use of a different criterion for deleting 
outliers. Much of the criticism of the Burnside and Dollar study concerns misspecification. 
Insertion of new, relevant variables into their specifications caused the interaction term 
between aid and policy to lose significance, a point also recognized by Burnside and Dollar 
(2004). Due to the similarities in methodology, this is a source of concern for the C&H study 
as well.  
 
As the empirical growth literature emphasizes, different theoretical growth models may yield 
different predictions on which variables to include. Even identical theoretical models can 
serve as background for econometric models with different sets of explanatory variables. The 
standard solution to sorting out appropriate variables is robustness testing, but C&H have not 
gone very far in this direction. Given the attention that this issue has drawn in the growth 
literature,12 and the small and internally heterogeneous sample used in C&H 2004, 
comprehensive robustness testing is appropriate in order to assess whether incremental change 
in variables affects the results. However, a robustness test without one of the most important 
variables, the CPIA, is not very informative, and we could therefore not test the fundamentals 
of the model used by C&H. Nevertheless, several methodological weaknesses can readily be 
identified and call into question the validity of the conclusions that C&H draw.  
 
C&H undertake only limited testing to determine which combination of variables should be 
included in the final specification of the aid-policy-growth relationship. They include “aid 
squared” but exclude “aid” after initial regressions show the term to be insignificant. They 
make no attempt to estimate policy squared. This is a dubious methodological approach. Since 
the purpose is to investigate the effect of aid and policy on growth, the regression should 
include aid and aid squared, policy and policy squared, and the aid-policy interaction, and 
these, in turn, should be interacted with post-conflict dummies.13 This more standard approach 
would yield eleven initial variables, rather than the seven which C&H use. Omitting "aid" in 
the regressions is particularly questionable. If aid has a positive effect on growth -- as most 
                                                 
11 The term "good macroeconomic policies" as used in this literature is either a composite index constructed 
from a country’s budget surplus, inflation, and the Sachs-Warner indicator of openness (Sachs and Warner 1995) 
or the CPIA.  
12 See Levine and Renelt (1992) for an extreme -bounds analysis applied to economic growth, and Salai-Martin, 
et al. (2003) for a less extreme robustness criterion (the Bayesian Averaging of Classical Estimates, BACE). 
13 As Hansen and Tarp (2000) demonstrate, a precise second-order Taylor approximation of a standard 
theoretical growth equation yields an empirical reduced form where both aid and aid squared are present. 
Moreover, a complete, second-order polynomial response surface in the growth-aid-policy space is defined by 
aid, aid squared, policy, policy squared, and aid interacted with policy. 
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other studies have found 14 -- and "aid" is used in virtually all other aid-growth studies, 
omitting this variable and only using "aid squared" is likely to impose an odd form on the 
relationship and may well influence the core results of C&H.  
 
The C&H method in arriving at their preferred specification also does not follow conventional 
econometric procedures. In their initial testing, they find that none of the four post-conflict 
variables (post-conflict 1, post-conflict 1 interacted with policy, aid squared, and aid-policy) 
are individually significant. But instead of testing for joint significance, which is standard 
procedure, C&H exclude each of the insignificant post-conflict variables one at the time. The 
result is that the interaction variable between post-conflict and aid-policy becomes significant, 
which is the basis of the first two conclusions noted above. This stepwise exclusion of 
variables is clearly ad-hoc, and, by omitting variables that could be jointly significant, could  
cause substantial bias in the results. 
 
A similar approach is adopted with respect to assessing the findings. C&H test whether their 
results depend on certain influential data points by removing one of the 13 observations, one 
at the time. A more appropriate method would be to see whether deleting two or three 
observations simultaneously from the regressions will have any effect. Given that the 
Burnside and Dollar interaction effects were not significant until they excluded five outliers, it 
is important to see whether deleting a similar number of outliers would affect the C&H 
interaction variables. Moreover, as Dalgaard and Hansen (2001), among others, point out, 
there may well be influential observations in the other dimensions of the growth relationship 
that affect the outcome and that need to be checked. In the C&H framework, outliers and 
influential data points of interest that should be subjected to criteria for deleting outliers in the 
study are in the CPIA index, initial GDP, aid, governance, and interaction terms. 
 
When carefully examined, the C&H study also raises questions regarding internal consistency 
in the model with which, at least implicitly, they operate. One of their findings is that aid to a 
typical post-conflict country is associated with an increase in economic growth that is almost 
150% higher than the association between aid and growth in a typical “normal” country 
(provided the timing is right). This is a remarkable impact of aid, and -- although C&H do not 
elaborate -- appears to reflect a condition of post-conflict countries that makes them differ in 
fundamental ways from countries that have not recently emerged from war. If post-conflict 
conditions generate particularistic relations between aid and growth, however, the same 
pattern might be expected with respect to growth and poverty. On the growth-and-poverty 
relationship, however, C&H 2004 assume that post-conflict countries conform to the general 
pattern that Collier and Dollar (2002) found for all countries. Although C&H do not directly 
test the relationship between growth and poverty on their post-conflict sample, they 
nevertheless conclude with recommendations regarding the optimal level of aid to produce 
“poverty-efficient” growth in post-conflict countries (p.14). Apart from the inconsistency in 
explanatory logic, the conclusion is particularly open to question insofar as the standard 
literature on the poverty-efficiency of growth shows wide variations and different patterns 
(Kanbur 2000).  
 
Overall, there is a tendency in the C&H paper to highlight conclusions that are likely to be 
welcomed in the aid community, while findings that are inconsistent with the literature or 
conventional wisdom are glossed over. In the latter category is their striking statistical finding 
                                                 
14 See Dalgaard, et al. 2000 for a survey of empirical analysis from the last 30 years. 
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that in post-conflict situations, “bad” macroeconomic policy is associated with rapid growth.15 
This surprising result – which is not discussed in the text, nor are the policy implications 
elaborated -- is precisely the opposite of the general conclusions in the literature, above all 
Burnside and Dollar (2000). Very few would believe that improvements in macro policy, such 
as improving fiscal policies or macroeconomic management, would reduce economic growth. 
Most likely, the C&H result signifies multicollinearity, which, if not accounted and corrected 
for, is likely to produce systemic biases in the findings and thus affect all the results. 
4. Recoding 
4.1 The C&H sample  
C&H use a conventional data set on civil wars, Correlates of War (COW (1984, 1994), as 
updated by Nicholas Sambanis. As they explain it, the data set uses a definition of “civil war” 
that entails “an internal conflict between a government and an identifiable rebel organization 
that results in at least 1,000 combat-related deaths, of which at least 5% must be incurred on 
each side” (p.3).16 
 
The threshold of battle-related deaths provides the core of commonality in the C&H sample. 
In other respects the sample is quite heterogeneous, notably with respect to duration, 
territorial scope of the fighting, the overall cost of the war, and the entities formally involved. 
For instance: 
 
Duration: three conflicts are coded as lasting one month or less (Romania 12/1989, Jordan 
9/1970, Burundi 8/1988), while another three conflicts lasted 15 years or longer 
(Mozambique, Peru, and Ethiopia).  
 
Territorial scope: in some cases the fighting was territorially concentrated with little impact 
outside the affected areas (e.g., the Muslim insurgency in the southernmost part of the 
Philippines; the conflict in Punjab in India); in other cases the war engulfed the entire country 
(El Salvador, Nicaragua). 
 
The formal entities involved: while COW initially made a distinction between civil wars and 
what they call “extra-systemic wars” – including colonial wars and wars of independence – 
C&H do not. They include two wars of independence (Southern Rhodesia/ Zimbabwe and 
Guinea Bissau) and two wars of colonial expansion (Morocco in West Sahara, and Indonesia 
in East Timor). As Sambanis notes (2002: 21-24), coding colonial wars entails particular 
problems regarding the location of the conflict and appropriate data. Thus, Indonesia’s war of 
conquest in East Timor was fought only in East Timor -- a tiny, peripheral area in relation to 
the metropolitan territory -- and the effects of the war were hardly felt outside the occupied 
area. Nevertheless, since separate data for East Timor were not available, C&H use data for 
                                                 
15 Table 6 in C&H 2004 shows a negative coefficient of the dummy post-conflict interacted with macro policy, 
and it is significant at 1%.  
16 C&H evidently take the figure to mean an accumulated threshold, i.e., “at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted 
during the civil war” (C&H 2003: 3). However, the COW data set originally used a threshold of 1,000 deaths per 
annum, and only in 1994 lowered the threshold 1,000 for the entire conflict (Sambanis 2002, p. 6). Since all but 
three of the conflicts in the C&H sample terminated before 1994, for all practical purposes they are analyzing 
conflicts with annual death rates of at least 1,000. 
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Indonesia as a whole. Similar problems do not arise for wars of independence, where separate 
data for the new state are more readily available.17 
 
The overall cost and relative cost: C&H do not use any estimate of the overall human and 
economic costs of the war, but the marked differences in duration of conflicts which all have 
the same minimum annual battle-related deaths indicate substantial differences in overall 
costs.18 Such differences are of particular interest in relation to aid, growth, and policy reform 
in the post-conflict period. Similarly, the cost of the conflict relative to the overall size of the 
economy is presumably a significant variable in relation to an analysis of post-conflict 
recovery.  
 
Variations of this kind matter little in a large sample, but in a small sample they can have a 
substantial impact. C&H apparently sacrificed homogeneity in order to get a larger set of 
numbers. Although they obtain some results that are statistically significant, it is unclear for 
what kinds of conflicts they are most relevant or whether there is a policy-relevant pattern of 
variation within the sample. 
 
While COW might be useful for studying the causes of conflict, as Collier and Hoeffler 
elsewhere argue,19 it is not self- evident that COW is equally useful for analyzing the 
consequences in terms of the impact of aid and policies on economic growth after civil wars. 
COW does not even distinguish between minor conflicts and major wars, a matter of evident 
significance for post-war economic reconstruction and growth. The Uppsala/PRIO data set 
would be more useful for this purpose as it distinguishes between three types of conflicts -- 
war, intermediate armed conflict, and minor armed conflict -- based on a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative assessments, including the number of battle-related deaths. COW, 
by contrast, does not include indicators relevant for postwar reconstruction policy such as 
relative cost or intensity of the violence, the territorial scope of the conflict, or forcible 
displacement of persons.20 
4.2 Recoding the data 
Although there is an argument for having common data sets that would provide a common 
basis for analysis of civil wars, when the analytical foci differ the argument for having 
differentiated data sets is even stronger.21 In consequence of this logic, Licklider (1995) 
constructed a separate data set to study how war ends, as did Hartzell, Hoddie, and Rothchild 
(2001) to test the determinants of the longevity of peace settlements. Other main data sets 
have been used to analyze causes of war, including COW and the Uppsala/PRIO sets, and 
                                                 
17 If the purpose was to explain the causes of war, rather than its consequence, a decision to include wars of 
independence raises similar problems of separate data availability for independent variables pertaining to the 
colonial territory (Sambanis 2002: 21-24). 
18 Of course, short wars can be destructive, especially international wars between organized state entities (e.g., 
the Six-Day War).  
19 Collier and Hoeffler (2002: 2). 
20 In the Uppsala/PRIO data set, “war” involves at least 1,000 battle-related deaths per year, “intermediate 
conflict” has between 25 and 1,000 deaths per year and a cumulative total for the entire conflict of at least 1,000 
deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year, and “minor armed conflict” has at least 25 deaths per year and 
fewer than 1,000 deaths accumulated during the course of the conflict. The qualitative criteria refer to the type of 
incompatibility among the parties (a conflict over government or territory) and their organization. See Annex 1. 
21 Mack (2002) makes an argument for “anointing” one data set to serve as a common basis for analysis, 
rejecting the pluralist argument for multiple sets. However, unless the single data set is extraordinarily rich in 
specifications, the argument for having different data sets to suit different research designs is particularly strong 
when the analytical foci differ markedly, for instance, as between the causes and the consequences of civil war.  
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were developed in part for that purpose. There is currently no civil war data set that includes 
the kind of indicators related to intensity, destruction, displacement, and relative cost that 
would be especially relevant for assessing the impact of aid in the post-war period. Data to 
construct such indicators are available, but scattered.22 
 
For this study, we limited our modifications of the C&H sample to the goal of recoding their 
basic data set and replicating their design so as to examine the effects of introducing 
incremental, measured changes in their sample on the conclusions they draw. Further study of 
the impact of aid and policy on post-war reconstruction should construct more appropriate 
data sets. Our recoding of the C&H/COW sample is a step in this direction by suggesting 
alternatives for improved coding criteria. 
 
In recoding the C&H data set, we had three aims: a) reducing the heterogeneity of the sample 
b) adjusting the time period when the case literature and comparable data sets indicated 
equally or more reasonable alternative end dates for the war, and c) correcting mistakes in the 
application of data sets. We then constructed a core sample based on recoding on all three 
accounts, and, in order to assess the impact of marginal variations, added individual 
borderline cases to produce three more recoded samples.  
(a) Reducing heterogeneity  
To reduce heterogeneity requires identifying a core in the recoded, more homogeneous set of 
units of analysis. C&H examine the aftermath of "civil wars," hence we settled for "civil 
wars" in a common sense understanding of the word. Without adopting an essentialist 
perspective, we note that "civil war" is typically associated with major destruction and 
dislocation. As Sambanis notes, “[o]ne of the main distinctions between civil war and other 
forms of violence is that civil war is usually associated with large-scale destruction” (2002, 
p.13). This is reflected in the terminology and the death-count criterion of the most widely 
used differentiated data set (Uppsala/PRIO), where “war” has a higher threshold of violence 
than “intermediate conflict” and “minor conflict.” The aftermath of civil wars – as distinct 
from lesser conflicts -- would probably reflect this variation as well. To what extent  the 
degree of destruction or dislocation in fact impacts on the growth-aid-policy interaction is an 
empirical question; the point here is that it can best be discovered by an initial sorting of cases 
that caused severe dislocations from those that did not.  
 
To allow for the differential impact of wars on the post-war period and simultaneously reduce 
the heterogeneity of the sample, we chose to include only conflicts that entail substantial 
dislocations and destruction. Data sets with numbers of combat-related deaths are inadequate 
for this purpose. Death figures may be high, but the dislocations of wars that typically 
impinge on post-war economic growth -- destruction of physical infrastructure, forcible 
displacement of people, and replacement of “normal” economies by wartime economies -- 
may still be minimal. Take, for example, the 1971 uprising in Sri Lanka, which is included in 
the C&H sample. C&H, COW and other comparable data sets record the event as “war” (see 
Annex II). In the case literature, by contrast, the 1971 violence is uniformly referred to as an 
                                                 
22 Several existing data sets each have one or more quantitative measures that would be useful in constructing a 
composite indicator of the intensity of the violence, such as geographic spread of the fighting, human cost, and 
displacement. These include Fearon (2001) and Collier, Hoeffler and Søderbom (2001), the State Failure 
(Political Instability) Task Force project, and De Soysa and Gleditsch (1999), in addition to UN agency statistics 
such as UNHCR data on forced displacement. Collier and Hoeffler (2001) suggest that geographic spread of the 
fighting and differences in GNP before and after the war would be useful indicators, while Sambanis (2002) calls 
for measures of relative cost, notably displacement and deaths relative to the total population. 
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uprising or an insurrection, not a war (K.M. de Silva 1981; Jupp 1978; Phadnis 1976). The 
violence easily meets the threshold of combat-related deaths in both the COW and 
Uppsala/PRIO data set for war (an estimated 10,000 were killed, mostly rebels). Yet there was 
minimal material damage and little population dislocation (except among the rebels). The 
rebels (JVP) were concentrated in the south-eastern coastal area. They were poorly trained 
and organized, and the government responded with decisive force. Most of the fighting was 
over in a matter of three days. Massive arrests and mopping-up operations followed 
(including execution of many detainees). As a result, issues of post-war reconstruction were 
only indirectly related to the bloody events insofar as the uprising itself was seen to discredit 
previous policies and encouraged a reassessment of macroeconomic policy.   
 
To capture at least some of these dimensions – let us call it the war- impact factor – we 
recoded according to an additional quantitative measure of the duration of the conflict and a 
qualitative assessment of the material destruction, geographic scope, and population 
displacement that was based on careful examination of the case literature. To qualify as a civil 
war, the violent events included in the C&H sample had to last more than two months and 
cause enough material destruction and population displacement over a sufficiently large area 
to make post-war reconstruction a recognized national policy task. 
  
Following these criteria, the 1971 uprising in Sri Lanka was excluded from our core sample. 
For the same reasons, we excluded Romania (1989) and Burundi (1988). C&H/COW are 
almost alone among comparable data sets in considering the 1989 events in Romania a "civil 
war." (See Annex II) The violence in question consisted of one to two weeks of street 
demonstrations and clashes between the demonstrators and the army, until the latter turned 
and triggered the downfall of the Ceausescu regime. There was minimal material destruction 
and displacement. Those who executed Ceausescu later argued with some reason that a civil 
war was in fact thereby prevented. Burundi (1988) is a difficult borderline case. The case 
literature treats the 1988 ethnic massacres as one of several violent phases in the continuing 
conflict between the Hutus and the Tutsis. There was no clearly defined post-"war" 
reconstruction, and refugees did not return. In fact, another and much larger massacre 
occurred in October 1993, when thousands were killed or displaced. The fluid nature of the 
violence makes it difficult to identify discrete "wars" – and the 1988 events appear differently 
in comparable data sets (Annex II). Clearly, if 1988 is treated as a "war" year, so should 1993, 
which C&H instead code as a "post-conflict" year. Nigeria (1980-84) is a similar case 
involving an ebb and flow in violence between the federal government and a communal-
religious movement, and various data sets record the conflict quite differently (see Annex II). 
We decided to keep the Nigeria case in our core sample, but excluded it from sample 3 and 4 
to assess its effect. 
 
C&H include two cases of what COW calls “extra-systemic, colonial war” – Indonesia (East 
Timor) and Morocco (Western Sahara). While COW excludes such wars in recognition of 
their distinct character, C&H decided to include them, perhaps to increase the size of the 
sample. The consequent problem of distortions arising from the use of national- level data, as 
noted above, is particularly severe in the case of Indonesia/East Timor. As a prototypical case 
of such distortions, it bears further elaboration: 
 
The 1975 invasion by Indonesian forces and the early military campaign had devastating 
consequences for East Timor in terms of widespread deaths, destruction of infrastructure, 
torching of villages, and forcible relocation of nearly half the population. During the 1980s 
("post-conflict" in C&H terms), Indonesian authorities undertook reconstruction and 
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development in the occupied territory. By some estimates, the GNP per capita of East Timor 
increased nearly five times. But C&H use national data for Indonesia on economic growth, 
aid, and policy ratings, thereby losing much of the effect of change within East Timor because 
of the huge difference in size between the metropolitan country and the occupied territory. At 
the time of the invasion, Indonesia’s population was 134 million, that of East Timor, 650,000. 
After East Timor was officially declared one of Indonesia’s 27 provinces in 1976, the 
occupation represented a net drain on the central state budget due to various subsidies, but in 
terms of the overall Indonesian economy, it was minimal. Only a small proportion of 
Indonesia's armed forces were deployed in East Timor (Schwarz 1994). Less than 10 per cent 
of the army participated in the invasion and the first military campaign (around 30,000 
soldiers). Since a large part of the Indonesian military budget at the time was realized by 
“unconventional financing” – mainly through enterprises and foundations run by the armed 
forces, including the army units in East Timor – the war and its aftermath were hardly felt in 
terms of official military expenditures (Crouch 1978; 2000) or foreign aid. East Timor, as an 
Indonesian foreign minister said, was only “a pebble in the shoe.” As for foreign aid in the 
"post-conflict period," there was certainly aid going into Indonesia in the 1980s, but not 
directly to East Timor. The occupation was regarded as illegal by the UN, and the territory 
was generally closed to outsiders by Indonesia until 1989. Hence, any rela tionship between 
aid-growth-and-policy as shown in the national data for Indonesia in the 1980s would have 
only a spurious relationship to the war and post-war reconstruction in East Timor.  
 
By contrast, while Morocco/West Sahara is generically a similar case of extra-systemic, 
colonial war, using national data on aid, growth, and policy is more defensible because of the 
huge impact of the war on the metropolitan polity and economy. The war lasted several years 
(C&H use the October 1975-November 1989 period), virtually all of Morocco's army was tied 
down in Western Sahara, and the economic cost of the war at one stage led to the withdrawal 
of food subsidies in Morocco proper and serious riots. Hence locating the war conceptually in 
Morocco and using aggregate data for the metropolitan country to represent the aftermath 
does make some sense. We therefore retained Morocco in our core sample. 
 
The recoding exercise so far shows the importance of tempering the search for a large-N 
sample by recognizing distinct sub-groups within. Consider the cases of Sri Lanka and 
Romania. In both Romania and Sri Lanka, economic policy, aid, and growth patterns did 
change in the aftermath of the conflict. The rationale and dynamic of the changes were not 
related to the damage caused by the war, however, but by quite different factors. In Romania, 
the violent demonstrations triggered the end of state socialism and the start of a transition to a 
market economy. The consequent liberalization of the economy eventually did generate aid 
and growth (World Bank 2003). In Sri Lanka, the 1971 uprising had partly been a response to 
the stagnating economy. The government subsequently liberalized the economy, which in turn 
attracted aid and investment and contributed to a sharp increase in growth rates towards the 
end of the decade (University of Bergen 1987). The policy implication in both cases is that 
“good” macroeconomic policy generates growth, which is exactly the reverse of what C&H 
conclude from their analysis of post-conflict situations. Had the C&H recommendations on 
policy priorities for post-conflict situations been followed, the result probably would have 
been the opposite of what C&H would have predicted. In the cases of Indonesia/East Timor 
and Morocco/Western Sahara, the implications for research design are somewhat similar. For 
purposes of studying the effects of war, data limitations suggest that colonial wars be 
recognized conceptually as a distinct category of civil wars. Yet, the distinction may be 
irrelevant in particularly intense conflicts, as in the Morocco/Western Sahara case. In either 
 12 
case, coding criteria need to be applied with benefit of qualitative insight from the case 
literature. 
b) Adjusting end dates 
End dates of war are as slippery as starting dates, as Sambanis (2002) notes. A sharp drop in 
battle-related deaths indicates an equivalent decline in fighting, but not necessarily the end of 
the war or a transition to reconstruction and peace. For purposes of identifying "post-conflict" 
periods, equally or more relevant markers may be institutional events that signal the war-to-
peace transition is irreversible, thereby allaying fear of renewed violence and encouraging 
collective investment in the future. Such markers may be a formal peace agreement, a UN-
supervised cease-fire, or mass arrest and trials of rebels. 
 
Using battle-related thresholds entail other difficulties as well. Assessments may reasonably 
differ, given the difficulty of obtaining precise casualty figures in many civil war situations. 
Determining the exact month when the casualty rate drops below a given threshold -- as the 
C&H methodology requires -- is even more exacting. As a result, some of the end dates used 
by C&H have a "soft" quality, a feature also found in other, comparable data sets and that is 
reflected in the variation among them (see Annex II). After carefully comparing the end dates 
used by C&H with those of three comparable data sets and in-depth examination of the case 
literature, we found five cases where a different end date was equally or more plausible (see 
Annex II). In most cases, we considered battle-related deaths in light of institutional 
characteristics of the kind suggested above. The changes were as follows: 
 
 
Conflict C&H date recoded Reason 
Morocco 11/1989 9/1991 UN-monitored 
ceasefire; cease-fire 
held 
Guatemala Coded as two wars: 
7/1966-7/1972, and 
3/1978-3/1984 
One war: 7/1966-6/1993 Case literature 
uniformly treats the 
conflict as one war, 
violence declines in 
1993, followed by 
break-through in 
negotiations 
Jordan 9/1970 7/1971 Major fighting 
continued, decisive 
army assault on the 
fedayeen in 7/1971 
Peru 12/1996 3/1993 Decline in violence, 
mass arrest of rebels, 
including the leadership 
Philippines 12/1996 9/1996 Peace agreement with 
rebels concluded 
c) Correcting mistakes in application 
Two coding cases in the C&H set must be described as plain mistakes, stemming from a poor 
match between the data base and the research design. The C&H study, it will be recalled, 
focuses on the post-war period, yet the main data set they use (COW) includes only civil 
wars. In two of the cases used by C&H, the end date for the civil war is correct, but C&H 
make no allowance for the fact that an international war simultaneously commenced. As a 
result, time periods that C&H code as "peace onset" and "post-conflict" were manifestly not 
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so. This is most obvious with respect to Iran, where C&H code "the war" as ending in 1982, 
and the remaining 1980s as years of "peace onset" and "post conflict." The 1980s, of course, 
was the period of the Iran-Iraq war (1982-88), which was enormously destructive and 
traumatizing for Iran. The consequences in terms of deaths, economic destruction, population 
dislocation, and social trauma were similar to those of a major civil war.23 A similar but less 
grotesque coding application is evident in the case of Somalia, where C&H use December 
1992 as the end of the (civil) war. They ignore the fact that major fighting occurred in mid-
1993 because now the conflict was not merely civil, but ranged US forces against the Somalis. 
In a narrow technical sense C&H are correct, yet in terms of their own research design the 
coding makes no sense. These cases again emphasize the pitfalls of using a data set primarily 
designed for studying the causes of war as a basis for assessing developments in the post-war 
period. 
5. Results from the recoded data sets 
After recoding, our core sample had five conflicts fewer than that used by C&H, and the end 
date of war had changed in another five cases. In the other three samples, we made only minor 
additional changes to assess the effects of smaller variations. In Sample 2, alternative dates 
were used for two conflicts. In Sample 3, one alternative date was used and one conflict 
excluded. In Sample 4, two alternative dates were used and one conflict excluded.  
 
The recoding samples are presented in Table 1. Countries in italics constitute the 13 
observations that are the basis for the first two of the three C&H conclusions, that is, where 
they have data regarding the impact of aid on growth after the end of the war. The other 
countries represent additional observations regarding the actual donor pattern of providing aid 
in the post-war period. Countries for which C&H have no data at all are marked with an 
asterisk, and it is unclear why these countries appear in the sample list. A blank space in the 
columns of our recoded samples 1-4 means we have accepted the C&H coding. Where we 
have not accepted their coding, this is indicated accordingly either by “no war” (taken out of 
the sample) or by our alternative date.  
 
 
                                                 
23 Iran's border region became a battlefield, forcing large number of people to flee. Teheran and other cities were 
bombed and attacked. Iraq's tanker-war severely hurt Iran's oil exports. The Iranian military's strategy of 
attacking with “human waves” produced massive casualties and a traumatized population. 
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Table 1. C& H sample and recoded samples 
Country Collier and 
Hoeffler 
(end of war) 
Sample 1 (Core) Sample 2 Sample 3 Sample 4 
Angola* 05/91  No data No data No data No data 
Burundi 12/73     
Burundi 08/88 No war No war No war No war 
Chad 08/88     
Congo* 10/97  No data No data No data No data 
El Salvador 01/92     
Ethiopia 05/91     
Guatemala 07/72 
Guatemala 03/84 
One war, ended 
06/93 
One war, ended 
06/93 
One war, ended 
06/93 
One war, ended 
06/93 
Guinea-Bissau 12/74     
India 06/94     
Indonesia 09/82 No war No war No war No War 
Iran 05/82 08/88 08/88 08/88 08/88 
Jordan 09/70  07/71 07/71 07/71 
Morocco 11/89  09/91   09/91 
Mozambique 10/92     
Nicaragua 07/79     
Nicaragua 04/90     
Nigeria 01/70     
Nigeria 08/84   No war No war 
Pakistan 07/77     
Peru 12/96 06/93 06/93 06/93 06/93 
Philippines 12/96 09/96 09/96 09/96 09/96 
Romania 12/89 No war No war No war No war 
Russia* 08/96  No data No data No data No data 
Rwanda* 07/94  No data No data No data No data 
Somalia 12/92 12/93 12/93 12/93 12/93 
Sri Lanka 05/71 No war No war No war No war 
Sudan 02/72     
Uganda 04/88     
Zimbabwe 12/79     
  
Setting aside for the moment the methodological constraints on the C&H study discussed in 
section 2 above, we tested the results by applying the exact same methodology on our recoded 
samples. We were only able to test empirically two of C&H's three main conclusions : that aid 
is considerably more effective in augmenting growth in post-conflict situations than in other 
situations, and that aid disbursement should increase during the first four  years after the 
conflict and then taper off towards the end of the decade after peace. Their third conclusion 
regarding policy priorities – i.e., that anti-poverty measures (“social policies”) have a positive 
impact on growth in post-conflict situations and therefore should be given priority in the 
reform process – is based on analysis of individual components of the CPIA. As we did not 
have access to this data set, we could not test this conclusion. 
 
Applying exactly the same methodology as C&H on a substantially recoded set of 
observations, and with a smaller number of conflicts, produced some similar and some 
different results. On their finding that aid has an extra effect on growth in post-conflict 
countries during the four to seven years after peace-onset, we find that the corresponding 
coefficients remain statistically significant in all four data sets (See Annex I). In other words, 
our testing supports the conclusion that aid is more productive with respect to growth during 
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the four-to-seven-year period after peace compared to other situations.24 The aid-policy-post-
conflict interaction variable thus seems quite robust to substantial changes in the post-conflict 
sample. Our results from the four recoded data sets also confirm that there are no extra effects 
of aid on growth during the first four years after peace-onset. None of the interaction terms 
from the regressions with the recoded data is significantly different from the findings of C&H. 
 
However, it is well known that statistical significance in itself does not imply that one has 
found an interesting economic relationship, even when there is a strong probability that the 
two variables are causally linked. If the magnitude of the coefficient does not correspond to 
economically meaningful measures, then a significant relationship may have little relevance 
for policy. We thus compare the coefficients to discuss C&H’s claim that aid is “considerably 
more” effective in generating growth in post-conflict societies as compared to other societies. 
 
Using our sample 2, plus a slightly different and preferred specification of variables, we found 
results that differed markedly from those of C&H.25 The coefficient indicating the effect of aid 
was less than half of the coefficient preferred by C&H. The implications for policy are 
important: using the original C&H sample and their preferred specification suggests a much 
greater growth effect of aid in the “peak period” (a 120 % “overstatement”) than if the 
recommendations had been based on our sample 2 and a slight change in specification. These 
minor changes were sufficient to produce a great difference in the magnitude of the growth 
effect of aid. The C&H conclusions in this regard are thus quite fragile. 
 
                                                 
24 Note, however, that we find that aid squared is not significant in any of the specifications that include peace-
onset variables, in contrast to the C&H specifications where it is significant at the 5% level. This dis crepancy in 
significance may be due to the inclusion of the aid term in our regressions; C&H do not include this variable. 
25 Limited access to the CPIA data set prevented us from analyzing the recoded data sets with our preferred 
specification, i.e., regressions with control variables plus post-conflict1-CPIA and post-conflict1-aid-CPIA. 
Nevertheless, the limited testing that was done for us using CPIA produced strong, illustrative figures. Using 
Sample 2 as an illustration, we can see from table 2 that the CPIA-post-conflict1 variable is significant when the 
aid-policy-post-conflict1 variable is included. Thus, the CPIA-post-conflict1 variable should not be excluded, 
and the best specification for Sample 2 is given in column S2, CH2 in table 2, where both of these variables are 
included. 
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Table 2. Interaction effects Sample 2 
 
 CH1 S2, CH1  CH2 S2, CH2  CH3 S2, CH3  
Initial per capita income 0.718 
(0.627) 
0.680 
0.640) 
0.715 
(0.621) 
0.676 
(0.637) 
0.717 
(0.618) 
0.677 
(0.636) 
Governance (ICRGE) 0.196 
(0.160) 
0.240 
0.157) 
0.197 
(0.157) 
0.241 
(0.155) 
0.198 
(0.157) 
0.235 
(0.154) 
CPIA 0.991** 
(0.397) 
0.835** 
0.413) 
0.991** 
(0.396) 
0.837** 
(0.413) 
0.988** 
(0.390) 
0.857** 
(0.408) 
ODAxCPIA 0.134** 
(0.066) 
0.190* 
0.112) 
0.134** 
(0.066) 
0.189* 
(0.112) 
0.134** 
(0.065) 
0.185* 
(0.111) 
ODA  -0.184 
(0.367) 
 -0.178 
0.366 
 -0.168 
(0.365) 
(ODA/GDP) 2  -0.028** 
0.012 
-0.026* 
0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
0.026* 
(0.014) 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
 0.026* 
(0.014) 
South Asia 2.614*** 
(0.644 
2.668*** 
0.643) 
2.611*** 
(0.639) 
2.666*** 
(0.641) 
2.619*** 
(0.625) 
 2.623*** 
(0.630) 
East Asia 2.891*** 
(0.663) 
3.023*** 
0.670) 
2.889*** 
(0.660) 
3.022*** 
(0.669) 
2.884*** 
(0.660) 
3.002*** 
(0.664) 
Sub-Saharan Africa -0.440 
(0.821) 
-0.535 
0.817) 
-0.442 
(0.817) 
-0.537 
(0.815) 
-0.442 
(0.816) 
 -0.541 
(0.813) 
Middle East/ 
North Africa 
1.590*** 
(0.568) 
 1.571*** 
0.560 
1.591*** 
(0.567) 
 1.569*** 
(0.559) 
1.589*** 
(0.567) 
1.571*** 
(0.559) 
Europe/Central Asia -0.400 
(1.059 
-0.424 
1.061 
-0.402 
(1.056) 
-0.423 
(1.060) 
-0.403 
(1.054) 
 -0.429 
(1.058)  
Post-conflict 1 1.385 
(3.237) 
-2.705 
2.860) 
1.445 
(3.073) 
-2.615 
(2.791) 
0.913 
(0.755) 
2.015*** 
(0.755) 
(Post-conflict1) x (CPIA) -0.186 
(1.011) 
1.519 
0.972) 
-0.180 
(1.019) 
1.550* 
(0.925) 
  
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) 2   
-0.009 
((0.102) 
-0.020 
0.094 
    
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) x (CPIA) 
0.168 
(0.330 
0.145 
0.303 
0.141*** 
(0.042) 
0.084** 
(0.039) 
0.139*** 
(0.041) 
 0.105*** 
(0.039) 
Observations 344 344 344 344 344 344 
Post-conflict observations 13 11 13 11 13 11 
R 2  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
 
 
It is evident that a study based on Sample 2 would give very different indications of the 
importance of phasing in aid during the four-to-seven-year period after the war. The results 
reveal that C&H’s preferred coefficient of aid-policy-post-conflict1 (table 2, Annex I column 
CH4) is 120% larger than the preferred coefficient in our Sample 2.26 The implications for 
policy are obvious: using the original C&H sample would suggest a much greater growth 
effect of aid in the “peak period” than if the recommendations had been based on our Sample 
2. Our sample 2, it will be recalled, consisted of the core sample plus minor changes in the 
end dates of two conflicts. This small change was sufficient to produce a great difference in 
the magnitude of the growth effect of aid. 
 
Let us further quantify the economic implications of these differences. If we omit all of the 
post-conflict interaction dummies discussed earlier, the general growth regression for all 
countries takes the form  
 
                                                 
26 The coefficients of the aid-policy-post-conflict1 variable in the other recoded data sets are 0.111, 0115, and 
0.124 for Samples 1, 4, and 3, respectively. 
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ZfPeAdAPcPbAag ++-+++= 22     (1) 
 
where  
 g = the growth rate 
 A = aid as a share of GDP 
 P = CPIA measure of policy and institutions 
 Z = a vector of control variables including their coefficients. 
 
We are interested in whether aid is more productive in terms of growth in post-conflict 
societies compared to other societies. Thus, assume that extrag is the extra impact from aid 
on growth that is found in post-conflict societies. In terms of the regression results, this effect 
is solely captured by the aid-policy-post-conflict interaction term. This implies that we 
separate the post-conflict component of the impact of aid on growth from the general impact 
of aid across all countries, and so 
 
qb APg extra =          (2) 
 
where b is the coefficient  
q is the post-conflict 1 dummy 
 
Increasing aid yields the following impact on growth for a post-conflict society 
 
P
dA
dg
b=           (3) 
 
Assume tha t policy makers are interested in how large the extra effect of aid on growth is in 
these societies, compared to the increase in growth that would occur in an average country in 
a normal situation. We therefore calculate the increase in growth from increasing the amount 
of aid to these countries in the period four to seven years after peace when this extra effect is 
found. The average CPIA for the countries in their first full period of post-conflict peace is 
given by C&H to be 2.88, while the average aid for these 13 observations of post-conflict1 
societies is 2.14. 
 
Using the C&H sample, increasing aid by 20% (50%) in the four-to-seven-year period after 
peace-onset increases the extra effect of aid on growth by 0.23 (0.57) percentage points. This 
is 120 percentage points above what the extra aid effect would be if our Sample 2 were used 
as a basis for calculation. Our Sample 2 coefficients indicate that increasing aid to the typical 
post-conflict country by 20% (50%) increases the economic growth by only 0.1 (0.26) 
percentage points above the normal. The comparison illustrates clearly the dangers of making 
policy recommendations based on results from a single sample.  
 
The second conclusion in C&H, namely that “aid disbursement should probably gradually rise 
during the first four years….” (p. 14) is not clearly grounded in their empirical results. They 
find, as we do in all the recoded data sets, that aid is just as effective in post-conflict societies 
during the first four years of peace as in normal societies. If growth-efficiency of aid is the 
overriding concern, the logical implication of this would be that no extra aid should be given 
in the immediate post-war period, rather than that aid should “gradually rise.” 
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The C&H conclusion that the extra effect of aid on growth in post-conflict societies is not 
sustained throughout the post-conflict decade, and hence should “gradually taper back to 
normal levels by the end of the first post-conflict decade” (p. 14), is problematic because of 
the small sample. While our findings confirm an extra effect of aid during the four to seven 
years after peace onset, we cannot say anything even reasonably conclusive about the effect 
during the subsequent period because of the limited number of observations (only eight). 
Hence there is insufficient empirical basis for concluding, as C&H does, that aid should 
“gradually taper back to normal” in the subsequent years.  
6. Conclusions 
The results of our retesting are in part subject to the same methodological shortcomings we 
have identified in the Collier and Hoeffler paper, and as such, must be treated with caution. 
Nevertheless, we were able to demonstrate that there can be quite large variation in the 
possible extra effect of aid on growth during the post-conflict period depending upon the 
identification of the sample and slight changes in the specification of the variables. By 
recoding according to stricter measures of what constitutes civil war, and using an empirically 
derived, improved specification, we found that aid had up to less than half the effect on the 
growth spurt in the four-to-seven-year period after peace than in the C&H results based on a 
heterogeneous sample of conflicts. By including a number of smaller conflicts that had little 
influence on the national economy, C&H evidently watered down the impact of the war on 
the post-war recovery process. Our finding underlines the importance of increasing internal 
consistency in the sample if the analysis is to generate relevant policy recommendations. If 
donors had followed the recommendation of doubling aid volumes to post-war societies 
compared to “normal” countries in order to achieve growth, and if our sample rather than that 
of C&H were representative of the countries in question, the donors would be in for a 
surprise. Both in absolute and relative terms, the growth generated by the extra aid would be 
negligible (0.26 percentage points).  
 
The policy implications of this finding are significant. If the extra growth generated by aid in 
the mid-decade period after peace-onset in reality is small or negligible, the trade-off between 
a growth-oriented aid policy and one that targets immediate peace dividend programs (e.g., 
demobilization, employment, or rehabilitation) is reduced.  
 
Our recoding also produced different results with regard to the impact of policy. C&H found 
that aid was more effective in generating growth in post-conflict countries than in “normal” 
situations, and found no additional effects of policy (as measured by CPIA) in post-conflict 
situations. We found that policy had an additional positive effect, and this held across all of 
our four recoded samples.  
 
Upon closer examination, then, it becomes clear that C&H 2004 present conclusions and 
policy recommendations that their data do not fully support. Apart from the recommendations 
regarding magnitude and timing of aid, there is weak or curious evidence for two related 
conclusions: 
· C&H cite “poverty-efficiency” of aid as an expected result of doubling the aid volume 
to post-conflict societies compared to “normal” countries. Yet they do not analyze the 
impact of aid and growth on poverty in post-conflict societies, but refer to the general 
literature on the relationship between growth and poverty-reduction.  This is a 
questionable procedure insofar as they find that aid, policy, and growth interact in 
unusual ways in post-conflict societies as compared to “normal countries.” It would at 
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least be reasonable to assume that this would equally apply to the aid, growth, and 
poverty interaction. 
· C&H conclude that improvement in “social policies” (as measured by the CPIA)27 has 
a positive impact on growth in post-conflict situations and therefore should be given 
first priority in the reform process, whereas “good” macroeconomic policy (as 
measured by the CPIA) should be the last priority in the temporal sequence. This 
conclusion rests on an interaction analysis which shows a strong and negative 
relationship between (good) macroeconomic policy and growth. This particular 
finding, which is not explained or further discussed, is so unusual as to require 
explanation. 
 
As our recoding exercise has shown, the C&H study illustrates the danger of drawing firm 
conclusions from a single sample in a field of quantitative analysis that has barely started to 
emerge and where the data are very limited. The very small sample used – in some cases only 
eight observations – accentuates this point and the related dangers of using it to derive general 
policy recommendations. 
 
The testing exercise also brought out more general, methodological issues. First, data sets 
must be appropriate to the research design; in this case, a data set with indicators relevant for 
the impact of war and post-war reconstruction would have been more useful than the standard 
battle-related death counts so commonly used in the analysis of causes of war. No such 
comprehensive data set exists at present, but some criteria for selection of indicators have 
been suggested above. Second, in the absence of a theoretically grounded model of how aid 
and policy variables are likely to influence economic growth after war, and how the 
relationships differ from those in “normal” countries, an appropriate specification of relevant 
variables might be determined empirically. This requires extensive testing, and certainly more 
so than done in the C&H study. 
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Annex I: Interaction Effects 
Table 1: Interaction effects 
[x,y] indicates that x is the value of the coefficients that is least significant among the four 
coefficients from the for different recoded data sets. Similarly, y refers to the value of the 
coefficient that is the most significant among the four coefficients. Then [(v,z)] indicates that 
x has a robust standard error of v, while y has a robust standard error of z.  
 
 CH1 Recoding CH1 CH2 Recoding CH2 
Initial per capita 
income 
0.718 
(0.627) 
[0.669, 0.680] 
[(0.642, 0.640)] 
0.715 
(0.621) 
[0.669, 0.676] 
[(0.642, 0.637)] 
Governance 
(ICRGE) 
0.196 
(0.160) 
[0.208, 0.240] 
[(0.158, 0.157)] 
0.197 
(0.157) 
[0.209, 0.241] 
[(0.156, 0.155)] 
CPIA 0.991** 
(0.397) 
[0.835**, 0.880**] 
[(0.414, 0.415)] 
0.991** 
(0.396) 
[0.837**, 0.882**] 
[(0.413, 0.415)] 
ODAxCPIA 0.134** 
(0.066) 
[0.184*, 0.190*] 
[(0.112, 0.112)] 
0.134** 
(0.066) 
[0.183*, 0.189*] 
[(0.112, 0.112)] 
(ODA/GDP) 2  -0.028** 
0.012 
(-0.024*, -0.026*) 
[(0.014, 0.014)] 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
(-0.024*, -0.026*) 
[(0.014, 0.014)] 
South Asia 2.614*** 
(0.644 
(2.636***, 2.668***) 
[(0.645, 0.643)] 
2.611*** 
(0.639) 
(2.633***, 2.666***) 
[(0.642, 0.640)] 
East Asia 2.891*** 
(0.663) 
(2.974***, 3.023***) 
[(0.670, 0.670)] 
2.889*** 
(0.660) 
(2.973***, 3.022***) 
[(0.669, 0.669)] 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-0.440 
(0.821) 
(-0.454, -0.535) 
[(0.818, 0.817)] 
-0.442 
(0.817) 
(-0.453, -0.537) 
[(0.817, 0.815)] 
Middle East/ 
North Africa 
1.590*** 
(0.568) 
(1.567***, 1.582***) 
[(0.573, 0.562)] 
1.591*** 
(0.567) 
(1.566***, 1.579***) 
[(0.573, 0.561)] 
Europe/Central 
Asia 
-0.400 
(1.059) 
(-0.408, -0.429) 
[(1.060, 1.055)]  
-0.402 
(1.056) 
(-0.405, -0.429) 
[(1.059, 1.053)]  
Post-conflict 1 1.385 
(3.237) 
(-0.314, -2.705) 
[(4.539, 2.860)] 
1.445 
(3.073) 
(-0.335, -2.615) 
[(4.626, 2.791)] 
(Post-conflict1) x 
(CPIA) 
-0.186 
(1.011) 
(0.561, 1.519) 
[(1.897, 0.972)] 
-0.180 
(1.019) 
(0.605, 1.550*) 
[(1.767, 0.925)] 
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) 2   
-0.009 
((0.102) 
(0.008, -0.039) 
[(0.968, 0.097)] 
 
 
 
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) x 
(CPIA) 
0.168 
(0.330 
(0.076, 0.219) 
[(0.316, 0.319)] 
0.141*** 
(0.042) 
(0.102**, 0.095***) 
[(0.051, 0.037)] 
Observations 344 344 344 344 
Post-conflict 
observations 
13 10-11 13 10-11 
R 2  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance 
at 5%, and * significance at 10%. All regressions include time dummies.  
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Table 2: Interaction effects, continued 
 
 CH3 Recoding CH3 CH4 Recoding CH4 
Initial per capita 
income 
0.717 
(0.618) 
[0.665, 0.677] 
[(0.637, 0.636)] 
0.712 
(0.617) 
[0.659, 0.659] 
[(0.636, 0.636)] 
Governance 
(ICRGE) 
0.198 
(0.157) 
[0.207, 0.235] 
[(0.155, 0.154)] 
0.172 
(0.155) 
[0.183, 0.182] 
[(0.156, 0.156)] 
CPIA 0.988** 
(0.390) 
[0.857**, 0.890**] 
[(0.408, 0.408)] 
1.021*** 
(0.064) 
[0.928**, 0.933**] 
[(0.412, 0.412)] 
ODAxCPIA 0.134** 
(0.065) 
[0.182*, 0.185*] 
[(0.112, 0.111)] 
0.127* 
(0.064) 
[0.170, 0.174] 
[(0.112, 0.112)] 
(ODA/GDP) 2  -0.028** 
(0.012) 
(-0.024*, -0.026*) 
[(0.014, 0.014)] 
-0.028** 
(0.012) 
(-0.024*, -0.024*) 
[(0.014, 0.014)] 
South Asia 2.619*** 
(0.625) 
(2.616***, 2.614***) 
[(0.631, 0.630)] 
2.662*** 
(0.620) 
(2.633***, 2.636***) 
[(0.633, 0.633)] 
East Asia 2.884*** 
(0.660) 
(2.965***, 3.002***) 
[(0.664, 0.664)] 
2.880*** 
(0.660) 
(2.923***, 2.921***) 
[(0.664, 0.663)] 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
-0.442 
(0.816) 
(-0.455, -0.541) 
[(0.815, 0.813)] 
-0.366 
(0.809) 
(-0.376, -0.385) 
[(0.814, 0.813)] 
Middle East/ 
North Africa 
1.589*** 
(0.567) 
(1.577***, 1.571***) 
[(0.572, 0.559)] 
1.606*** 
(0.563) 
(1.600***, 1.619***) 
[(0.566, 0.560)] 
Europe/Central 
Asia 
-0.403 
(1.054) 
(-0.410, -0.430) 
[(1.058, 1.053)]  
-0.365 
(1.053) 
(-0.391, -0.394) 
[(1.057, 1.054)]  
Post-conflict 1 0.913 
(0.755) 
(1.324, 2.015***) 
[(0.991, 0.755)] 
  
(Post-conflict1) x 
(CPIA) 
    
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) 2   
   
 
 
(Post-conflict1) x 
(ODA/GDP) x 
(CPIA) 
0.139*** 
(0.041) 
(0.105***, 0.124***) 
[(0.039, 0.040)] 
0.186*** 
(0.046) 
(0.199***, 0.188***) 
[(0.055, 0.051)] 
Observations 344 344 344 344 
Post-conflict 
observations 
13 10-11 13 10-11 
R 2  0.38 0.38 0.38 0.38 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** indicates significance at 1%, ** significance 
at 5%, and * significance at 10%. All regressions include time dummies.  
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Annex II: Civil-War Coding of Comparable Datasets 
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X Civil War 
E Extra Sy stemic War 
M Minor Armed Conflict  
I Intermediate Armed Conflict  
* War ongoing by the end of the study 
 
C&H Collier and Hoeffler (2003), Table A1 
Operationalization of Civil War: (a) an internal conflict between a government and an identifiable rebel organization that results 
in at least 1,000 combat-related deaths, (b) of which at least 5% must be incurred on each side 
 
COW Correlates of War Project (1993). This older version of the COW -Project is what Collier and Hoeffler (2003) give as their source 
for use in the A1 table. 
 Operationalization of Civil War: (a) military action was involved, (b) the national government at the time was actively involved, 
(c) effective resistance (as measured by the ratio of fatalities of the weaker to the stronger forces) occurred on both sides, and (d) 
at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted during the civil war. 
Note: Guatemala: (1) Government vs. Indians, (2) Government vs. leftists of 1978. COW also refers to a third war, 70-71: 
Government vs. leftists of 1970. 
 Indonesia: East Timor 
 Iran: Anti-Shan-Koalition, Mujahidin  
 Nigeria: (1) Biafra; (2) Muslim fundamentalists 
  
U/P:  Armed Conflict Dataset, 1946-2001.  Uppsala Conflict Data Project and the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
Operationalization of Civil War (Internal Armed Conflict): Internal armed conflict occurs between the government of a state and 
internal opposition groups without intervention from other states. Minor Armed Conflict: at least 25 battle-related deaths per year 
and fewer than 1,000 battle-related deaths during the course of the conflict. Intermediate Armed Conflict: at least 25 battle-related 
deaths per year and an accumulated total of at least 1,000 deaths, but fewer than 1,000 in any given year. War: at least 1,000 
battle-related deaths per year.  
Note:  Burundi: Tutsi Supremacists 
Indondesia: (1) East Timor; (2) West Papua; (3) Aceh 
Iran: (1) Government vs. Mujahideen e khalq; (2) Territory of Arabistan; (3) Territory of Kurdistan 
Jordan: 1970 is not coded as war, but is mentioned in their list of unclear cases. Explanation: unclear incompatibility 
Morocco: Territory of Western Sahara 
Nigeria: (1) Military faction; (2) Territory of Biafra 
Nigeria: the period of 1980-84 is mentioned in their list of unclear cases. Explanation: Unclear level of organization 
and unclear incompatibility 
Peru: Peruvian government vs. Shining Path, Red Path, MRTA 
 
CWT: Civil War Termination Data, Licklider (1995) 
Operationalization of Civil War: involvement of large-scale violence, killing people. (a) 1,000 battle deaths or more per year and 
(b) effective resistance, that is, at least two sides must have been organized for violent conflict before the war started or else the 
weaker part must have imposed causalities on its opponent equal to at least 5% of it s own. 
Note:  Indonesia: (1) East Timor 
  Nigeria: (2) Muslim fundamentalists  
 
Holsti: Major armed conflicts by region and type, 1945-1995, Appendix to K. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (1996) 
Operationalization of civil war: (a) state vs. nation wars: including armed resistance by ethnic, language or religious groups, often 
with the purpose of secession or separation from the state; or (b) internal wars based on ideological goals. 
Note: Burundi: (1) Tutsi-led government vs. Hutu rebels (2) Tutsi government massacre of Hutu civilians 
Guatemala: Guatemalan government vs. URNG rebels 
Indonesia: (1) Indonesian government vs. OPM rebels in Irian Jaya. (2) Indonesian government vs.. FRETILIN rebels 
Iran: (1) Iranian (Saha) government vs. fundamental Islamic (Khomeini) rebels; (2) Iranian government vs.. Kurdian 
rebels 
  Morocco: Irredenta / secession / resistance. Morocco, Mauritania (to 1979) governments vs.. POLISARIO rebels 
  Nigeria: Nigerian government vs. Ibo rebels in Biafra 
Peru: (1) Peruvian government vs. Sendero Luminoso rebels; (2) Peruvian government vs.. MRTA rebels 
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Annex III:  Countries, War Dates, and Observations, Table A1 in 
C&H 2004 
 
 
Country Start of the 
War 
End of the 
War 
Peace-onset Post conflict 
1 
Post conflict 
2 
Angola 11/75 05/91     
Burundi 4/72 12/73  *  
Burundi 08/88 08/88  *  
Chad 03/80 08/88  * * 
Congo 97 10/97     
El Salvador 10/79 01/92 * **  
Ethiopia 7/74 05/91 * **  
Guatemala 07/66 07/72  **  
Guatemala 03/78 03/84 * * ** 
Guinea-Bissau 12/62 12/74  ** * 
India 84 94 *   
Indonesia 06/75 09/82 * ** ** 
Iran 06/81 05/82   * 
Jordan 09/70 09/70  * * 
Morocco 10/75  11/89 * ** ** 
Mozambique 07/76 10/92  *  
Nicaragua 10/78 07/79 *   
Nicaragua 03/82 04/90 * **  
Nigeria 01/66 01/70  **  
Nigeria 12/80 08/84 * ** ** 
Pakistan 01/73 07/77 * ** ** 
Peru 03/82 12/96 *   
Philippines 09/72 12/96 *   
Romania 12/89 12/89  *  
Russia 12/94 08/96     
Rwanda 10/90 07/94     
Somalia 05/88 12/92 **   
Sri Lanka 04/71 05/71  ** ** 
Sudan 10/63 02/72  ** ** 
Uganda 10/80 04/88  * * 
Zimbabwe 12/72 12/79 * ** ** 
 
Cols 2&4: two asterisks indicate that the post-conflict observations are included in the 344 
sample, one asterisk indicates that the observation was also included in the 532 sample.  
 
  
Summary 
This paper retests the analysis of “Aid Policy and 
Growth in Post-Conflict Societies,” by Paul Co llier 
and Anke Hoeffler (October 2002 and forthcoming 
in European Economic Review). It finds that their 
data and analysis do not support their conclusions 
and policy recommendations on the optimal timing 
and amounts of aid. These conclusions depend on 
very few observations (13 for the period of peace-
onset, 13 for years 4 to 7 when a growth spurt is said 
to make aid particularly effective, and 8 for the 
period when aid should taper off); are vulnerable to 
the same methodological misspecifications identified 
in the Burnside and Dollar approach on which this 
analysis is based; and are not grounded in any 
theoretical formulation about the special relation 
between aid and growth in post-conflict conditions. 
Conventional econometric procedures are often not 
followed; recoding the sample to exclude cases that 
are not civil wars reduces the effect of aid on growth 
in post-civil war countries to less than half of what 
they claim; and the difference with the relationship 
for “normal” countries becomes negligible (0.26 
percentage points), although it depends on 
identification of the sample. Their claims on the 
poverty-efficiency of aid are assumed, not analysed. 
The confidentiality of their policy measure (CPIA) 
prevented testing the aid-policy relationship. 
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